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CASE NOTES
tions in matters involving federal taxes generally. Freuler and Blair may no
longer be viable precedent insofar as they give binding recognition to the
determination of property rights by state courts. The fact that the Bosch
holding is expressly limited to estate tax controversies does not rule out this
result because the Court could not reasonably have extended this holding
beyond the area of federal taxation with which it was immediately concerned.
It is not difficult to imagine that the Court, when faced with a case involving
a federal income tax controversy, will point to the principles expressed in
Bosch. It could well find that strict construction of the tax statute involved
was necessary and could again refer to the finding that the Erie doctrine
requires a federal court to look to state law as propounded by the state's
highest court. The fact that both the Blair and Freuler decisions preceded the
establishment of the Eric doctrine is significant in this regard.
It is submitted that when the implications and scope of the Bosch deci-
sion become clear, the Freuler and Blair cases will no longer be viable in any
significant respect. The Court's clear rejection of the nonadversary or collu-
sion test as evidenced by its express language and by its failure even to con-
sider the guidance provided by the Treasury Regulations casts doubt upon the
future validity of this test in any area of federal taxation. The elimination of
this test would appear to leave no other reasonable ground on which to base a
determination that a state trial court decision should or should not be given
binding effect. The only alternatives, then, are to give state trial court
decisions binding effect under all circumstances in all federal non-estate tax
controversies, or, likewise, to preclude the binding effect of state trial court
decisions under all circumstances. The Bosch decision would seem to demand
the latter alternative.
JOHN V. WOODARD
Fair Labor Standards Act-1966 Amendments—Interstate Commerce—
State Sovereignty.—Maryland v. Wirtz.'—In 1966, Congress amended the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 2 The amendments extended the Act's
minimum wage and overtime provisions to employees of certain enterprises,
whether public or private, engaged in the operation of schools, hospitals, and
related institutions, and employees of electric railway, trolley and motorbus
systems .2 States and their political subdivisions, insofar as they are employers
269 F. Supp. 826 (D. Md. 1967), prob. juris. noted, 88 S. Ct. 772 (1968).
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1964), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 203-04, 206, 207, 213, 214,
216, 218 (Supp. II, 1965-66).
a It should be noted that not all employees engaged in these activities are covered
because § 13 of the Act exempts persons employed in a bona fide executive capacity
(including any employee employed in the capacity of academic, administrative per-
sonnel or teacher in elementary or secondary schools). 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1964), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 213 (Supp. II, 1965-66). Also, the 1966 Amendments provide for
an escalation of the minimum wage and overtime provisions over a five-year period for
first-covered employees, i.e., they will receive $1.00 per hour for the first year with
increases of 15 cents per hour each year until the wage reaches $1.60 per hour. Id.
§ 206. Overtime pay will be required for time worked over 44 hours per week the first
year, over 42 hours per week the second, and for over 40 hours per week thereafter. Id.
§ 207.
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engaged in the listed activities, were brought within the FLSA's coverage for
the first time by an amendment to the Act's definition of "employer." 4
The state of Maryland, with twenty-five states intervening, brought an
action in a three-judge federal district court in Maryland for a declara-
tory judgment as to the constitutionality of the 1966 Amendments inso-
far as they apply to the states, their agencies and political subdivisions. In
attacking the amendments, the plaintiff states specifically complained only of
their application to public schools and hospitals. The states also sought to
enjoin enforcement of the amendments against those institutions. Stipulations
of fact were made in order to demonstrate the relation of state schools and
hospitals to interstate commerce. As an example, in Maryland, which was
accepted as representative of the other states, 87 percent of the medical sup-
plies and equipment for the University of Maryland hospital and seven other
state hospitals was purchased from outside the state .°
The primary contentions of the states were (1) that such activities, when
conducted by a state and its subdivisions, do not constitute commerce within
the meaning of the Constitution, (2) that state schools and hospitals are
"ultimate consumers" and are thus excluded from coverage under the FLSA,
and (3) that application of the FLSA to such activities is an unconstitutional
infringement on state sovereignty contrary to the tenth amendment. Addi-
tionally, the states asserted the unconstitutionality of the "enterprise con-
cept;" a concept incorporated into the Act by amendment in 1961 in order to
provide for coverage of those employees not directly engaged in commerce or
in the production of goods for commerce.° The district court HELD: The
operation of schools and hospitals by the states and their subdivisions affects
interstate commerce to a substantial degree, and the application of the mini-
mum wage provisions of the FLSA to these institutions is (1) a valid exercise
of the commerce power, (2) not an undue infringment upon state sovereignty,
and (3) not rendered unconstitutional by use of the enterprise concept? The
court further stated, however, that the states would be free to challenge the
overtime provisions of the Act, as applied to state employees, in future cases
presenting specific situations.' This holding represents a synthesis of the in-
dividual and rather diverse opinions written by each of the three district court
judges. Pending decision by the Supreme Court, enforcement of the FLSA
against state supported schools and hospitals is restrained, under an order
of the trial court, in all states which are parties to the suit.°
This decision marks a significant step in the ever-broadening use of the
4 'Employer' includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of
an employer in relation to an employee but shall not include the United States
or any State or political subdivision of a State (except with respect to employees
of a State, or a political subdivision thereof, employed (1) in a hospital,
institution, or school. . . .
29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1964), as amended, (Supp. II, 1965-66).
5 For facts demonstrating the relation of the state institutions to interstate com-
merce, see 269 F. Supp. at 833-34.
6 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(r)-(s) (1964), as amended, (Supp. II, 1965-66).
7 269 F. Supp. at 831-32; see also id. at 847 (Thomsen, J., concurring in part).
8 269 F. Supp. at 852.
9 2 CCH Lab L Rep. 30,012 (Nov. 3, 1967).
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commerce power by Congress in dealing with the economic and social needs
of the nation. The 1966 Amendments represent a substantial interference by
the federal government with the administration of public institutions by the
states, and consequently, provoke consideration of the true constitutional
relationship, in terms of political sovereignty, between the states and the
federal government. More specifically, the instant case raises questions con-
cerning (1) the constitutionality of the enterprise concept, (2) state schools
and hospitals as "ultimate consumers" and thus as excluded from the ambit
of the Act, and (3) the commerce power as limited by the concept of state
sovereignty.
Prior to 1961, the FLSA had applied only to those employees who them-
selves engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. With
the inclusion of the enterprise concept in the FLSA, an employee of an enter-
prise covered by the Act is entitled to the Act's benefits regardless of whether
his particular activities constitute engagement in commerce or in the produc-
tion of goods for commerce. 1 ° Thus, all employees of various enterprises are
covered on the basis of the coverage status of their employer, rather than on
the basis of the nature of the activities they personally perform. The anoma-
lous situation possible prior to 1961, wherein employees worked side by side
while only some were covered by the Act was, therefore, eliminated."
Before enterprise coverage applies the employer must qualify as an
enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. 12
Such an enterprise is one "which has employees engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce ..." (Emphasis added.) and, for purposes
of the FLSA, includes "employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on
goods that have been moved in or produced for commerce by any person
...." 13 Though the Act does not set forth the number of employees who must
be so engaged before the enterprise itself qualifies, legislative history, which
has been relied on by the courts, would indicate that the requirement is "two
or more." 14
10 See 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1964), as amended, (Supp. II, 1965-66). In amending the
Act to include this concept, Congress was of the opinion that "Ethic fact that the
minimum wage and overtime provisions of the present act extend only to some and not
all employees of an employer engaged in commerce is due entirely to the restrictive
wording of the statute . . ." S. Rep. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1961).
11 The constitutionality of the enterprise concept has previously been unsuccessfully
attacked. Wirtz v. Edisto Farms Dairy, 242 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.S.C. 1965); Goldberg v.
Ed's Shopworth Supermarket, Inc., 214 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. La. 1963). For a brief
discussion of the concept's side-by-side coverage, see 41 Notre Dame Law. 596, 606 (1966).
12 29 U.S.C. § 206(b) (1964), as amended, (Supp. II, 1965-66).
13 Id. § 203(s). It is recognized that this definition is susceptible of the interpretation
that an enterprise which only has employees handling, selling, or using goods that have
been moved in commerce is covered by the Act. See Wirtz v. Edisto Farms Dairy, 242
F. Supp. 1 (E.D.S.C. 1965) and Rhude v. Jansen Constr. Co., 369 F.2d 806 (5th Cir.
1966). The more reasonable interpretation, however, requires that some employees
actually be engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. Had the
former interpretation been intended, the definition logically would have been phrased—or
having employees handling, selling, etc. The latter interpretation, furthermore, is in keep-
ing with the intent of Congress to continue to apply the "commerce" and "production
for commerce" concepts of coverage. See H. Rep. No. 75, 87th Cong., 1st Sess 7 (1961).
14 H.R. Rep. No. 327, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1961); See also Rhude v. Jansen
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The enterprise concept was attacked in the present case as unconstitu-
tional on the ground that it extends the commerce power to employees whose
activities bear no relation to interstate commerce. In Wickard v. Filburn, 15 the
Supreme Court indicated the broad reach of the commerce power in stating
that even if the activity "be local and though it may not be regarded as com-
merce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce . . . ." 16 In light of this
statement constitutional objections to the enterprise concept of coverage would
appear to be tenuous. If some employees of a given enterprise are engaged
in commerce, it is at best inconsistent to contend that the activities performed
by the remainder of the employees of that enterprise do not have an effect
upon interstate commerce.
The validity of the enterprise concept would also appear to be supported
by similar coverage provisions of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), 17 which was also enacted under the commerce power. Under that
Act, the National Labor Relations Board has jurisdiction over any person en-
gaging in any unfair labor practice affecting commerce. 18 This criterion of
affecting commerce was applied by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Reliance
Fuel Oil Corp.?' wherein the only issue before the Court was "whether on
the record before it the Board properly found that it had jurisdiction to enter
an order against Reliance ...."2° Reliance Fuel Oil Corporation was engaged
in the local distribution of fuel oil, which it purchased within the state from
Gulf Oil Corporation, a supplier engaged in interstate commerce. The Court
reversed per curiam the court of appeals decision that jurisdiction of the Board
had not been established. "That activities such as those of Reliance affect com-
merce and are within the constitutional reach of Congress is beyond doubt!" 21
Once the jurisdiction of the Board is established, the Act's coverage is not
limited to those employees who are themselves engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce, but rather is extended to all of the em-
ployer's employees. The enterprise concept is designed to reach a like result
in the application of the FLSA.
In order to understand the argument of the states, in the present case,
that their institutions are "ultimate consumers" and thus excluded from
coverage under the FLSA, the Act's definition of "goods" must be examined.
"Goods" means goods (including ships and marine equipment),
wares, products, commodities, merchandise, or articles or subjects
Constr. Co., 369 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1966); Donahue, Wage and Hour Law Develop-
ments—The Fair Labor Standards Act, N.Y.U. 15th Annual Conf. on Labor 137, 139-40
(1962).
15 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
16 Id. at 125.
17 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1964), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 154 (Supp. II, 1965-66).
15 Id. § 160(a) (1964). "The term 'affecting commerce' means in commerce,
or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or
tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow
of commerce." Id. § 152(7).
15 371 U.S. 224 (1962).
20 Id. at 225.
21 Id. at 226.
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of commerce of any character, or any part or ingredient thereof,
but does not include goods after their delivery into the actual physi-
cal possession of the ultimate consumer thereof other than a pro-
ducer, manufacturer, or processor thereof. 22 (Emphasis added.)
On the basis of the exclusionary clause in this definition, the states argued
that their institutions did not qualify as an "enterprise" under the definition
stated above. 23
The proper interpretation of the operation of this "ultimate consumer"
exclusionary clause was indicated by the Supreme Court in Powell v. United
States Cartridge Co. 24
 In that case an independent contractor which operated
a government munitions plant was sued for overtime compensation as re-
quired by the FLSA. The title to the plant, equipment, work in progress,
and finished munitions was in the Government, and the plant's output was
shipped out of state on government bills of lading. In rejecting the con-
tractor's argument that the Act did not apply because the Government was
the ultimate consumer of the munitions, the Court stated that the purpose
of the exclusionary clause is to protect ultimate consumers from prosecution
for violation of the so-called "hot goods" provision of the Act. 23 Under this
provision,26 it is unlawful for any person to transport or ship in commerce
any "goods" which were produced by persons employed in violation of the
wage and overtime provisions of the Act. Therefore, if an ultimate consumer,
after acquiring physical possession of goods made by persons employed in
violation of the FLSA, sells or in any way moves those goods in commerce, he
is protected from prosecution.
It is submitted that to construe the exclusionary clause to mean that
state institutions are not engaged in commerce, because the goods they import
lose their interstate character after they are in the institution's actual physical
possession, is to give that clause a meaning wholly unrelated to its purpose
and operation in the Act. Furthermore, the exclusionary clause takes effect
only after the goods are in the actual physical possession of the ultimate
consumer27 and it in no way indicates that the activities of the ultimate
consumer, prior to such possession, may not constitute engagement in com-
merce. As a practical matter, it would even appear questionable whether the
institutions are the ultimate consumers of such goods as foodstuffs and drugs,
which are respectively served to students and administered to patients.
Irrespective of the status of state institutions as ultimate consumers,
other activities they perform may fulfill the requirement of enterprise cover-
age, i.e., that they have some employees engaged in commerce or in the
22 29 U.S.C. § 203(1) (1964).
23 This argument was not considered by the court, as it was considered "one of
statutory construction, not of constitutional significance . . . ." The court indicated
such an argument would best be asserted in a case challenging the application of the
ELSA to a particular school or hospital. 269 F. Supp. at 831 n.12.
24 339 U.S. 497 (1950).
25 Id. at 513-14 & 514 n.16; See also Gordon v. Paducah Ice Mfg. Co., 41 F. Supp.
980, 986 (W.D. Ky. 1941).
26 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(i) (1964).
27 See Gordon v. Paducah Ice Mfg. Co., 41 F. Supp. at 986.
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production of goods for commerce. Each year billions of dollars are distributed
to state and local schools and hospitals through federal programs and agencies.
As a consequence of this movement of federal funds, the state institutions are
required to prepare numerous documents, reports, and records for interstate
transmission. In Public Bldg. Authority v. Goldberg,28
 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that Social Security Adminis-
tration employees engaged in preparing benefit claims subsequently mailed
throughout ten southeastern states were producing goods for commerce. 23
Employees in a branch office of a nationwide small loan organization have
also been found to be engaged in commerce on the basis that they collected
funds and prepared reports for out-of-state transmission. 3° These cases would
appear to call for the conclusion that state employees who perform the services
necessitated by the vast intergovernmental flow of funds and information to
state schools and hospitals are engaged in commerce. This conclusion is also
supported by the FLSA's broad definition of "commerce" as "trade, commerce,
transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States or
between any State and any place outside thereof." 31
Assuming that state schools and hospitals have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce, the most significant question presented to the court in
the instant case concerns the conflict between federal use of the commerce
power and state sovereignty. The question can be stated as whether the
extension of the commerce power to state institutions, through imposition of
the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA, is prohibited by
the concept of dual sovereignty or federalism as embodied in our Constitu-
tion. That the 1966 Amendments to the FLSA do place a substantial burden
on the states in areas involving essential state functions must be admitted.
Illustrative of the burden imposed on the states is a projection of the cost of
applying the Act to public institutions in the state of Texas, a plaintiff
state. Expenditures of the Texas Youth Council will be increased by over
$3,000,000 annually, those of the Department of Mental Health and Mental
Retardation by $7,500,000 and one of the larger independent school districts
in the state will require approximately $575,000 in additional annual revenue
by 1971. The more than 1,300 other such districts in the state face propor-
tionate increases. 32
In light of this financial burden, the states contended that through the
1966 Amendments of the FLSA Congress is dictating the allocation of state
revenues and, consequently, impugning the political sovereignty of the states.
This issue was answered differently by each of the three district court judges.
Judge Winter found the extension valid as to both the minimum wage and the
overtime provisions. Judge Thomsen found the extension valid only with
respect to the minimum wage provisions, and Judge Northrup found the
28 298 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1962).
23 Id. at 371.
30 Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Wirtz, 346 F.2d 340, 341-42, 344 (7th Cir. 1965); see
also Willmark Serv. Sys. Inc. v. Wirtz, 317 F.2d 486 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
897 (1963).
at 29 U.S.C. § 203(6) (1964).
32 269 F. Supp. at 851 n.15.
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extension totally invalid. Such a diversity of opinion prompts an analysis of
the cases and criteria employed by the judges in reaching their differing
conclusions.
Judge Winter based his conclusion that the 1966 Amendments are con-
stitutional on several cases which have upheld federal regulation of state
functions and activities. In Sanitary District v. United States, 33
 the Supreme
Court was concerned with a federal-state dispute as to the rate at which water
could be removed from Lake Michigan by the Sanitary District of Chicago
for use in that city's sewage disposal operation. The Court sustained federal
regulation of the removal rate, and concluded that "[p]robably the dangers
to which the City of Chicago will be subjected if the decree is carried out
are exaggerated, but in any event we are not at liberty to consider them here
as against the edict of a paramount power." 34
A later case, Board of Trustees v. United States, 35 involved a suit by the
University of Illinois for the refund of customs duties paid on scientific appa-
ratus imported for use in one of its educational departments. The University
argued that the power over commerce could not constitutionally be exerted
so as to substantially burden the States in their exercise of governmental
activities. In denying the refund, the Court stated that there was "no en-
croachment on the power of the State as none exists with respect to the
subject over which the federal power has been exerted." 3° Four years later
the Court expressed a similar sentiment in a case where the question raised
was whether the Safety Appliance Act applied to an intrastate railroad
operated by the State of California to facilitate the commerce of a port."
The railroad and the larger part of the traffic it handled had its origin or
destination outside the state. After finding that the Act applied to this rail-
road, the Court rejected the argument that state sovereignty was capable of
limiting the scope of the commerce power, stating that the "state can no more
deny the power if its exercise has been authorized by Congress than can an
individual."38
From these decisions two principles may be extracted. First, the effect
upon the states resulting from regulatory legislation is not relevant in the
determination of the validity of that legislation as an exercise of the commerce
power. Secondly, state sovereignty and the commerce power are theoretically
precluded from coming into conflict, for a
logical interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Constitution
clearly and unavoidably forbids the idea that the reserved powers
of the States comprise an independent limitation upon the dele-
gated powers of the National Government. By the terms of the
Tenth Amendment if a power is delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, it is not reserved to the States .. . 39
33 266 U.S. 405 (1925).
34 Id. at 432; see also Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S.
508 (1941).
35 289 U.S. 48 (1932).
35 Id. at 59.
37 United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
38 Id. at 185.
29 E. Corwin, The Commerce Power versus States Rights 255-56 (1936).
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Unless the instant case can be distinguished from the decisions giving rise
to these principles, it would appear that the states' claim of unconstitutionality
based on state sovereignty was properly denied by Judge Winter. It is sub-
mitted that no relevant distinction exists.
While the educational and health facilities involved in the instant case
are "essential" to the welfare of the states' people, the problem of adequate
sewage disposal in the Sanitary District case could also be categorized as
involving an "essential" function of local government. The burden to be
imposed upon the states by the FLSA is undoubtedly a heavy one. This does
not appear to offer a valid distinction with respect to prior case law, however,
in view of the Supreme Court's clear indication that such evidence is not
relevant to the validity of an exercise of the commerce power."
It could be argued that a distinction exists in the fact that the present
case involves federal regulation of the wages of employees who in only the
most indirect way affect interstate commerce. In Wickard v. Filburn,41 how-
ever, distinctions based on directness of effect were denied constitutional
effect. There the activity regulated by the commerce power was the pro-
duction of wheat "not intended in any part for commerce but wholly for
consumption on the farm." 42
 The Court stated that an intrastate activity
could "be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce ..." whether or not "such effect is what might at some
earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect.'"43
 The principles set
down in Wickard, moreover, are not limited to private as opposed to public
activity. Twenty-four years following that decision a case arose questioning
the validity of federal regulation of wheat grown on state mental and penal
farms." The wheat was prevented from entering either interstate or intrastate
commerce by a provision of the state constitution. The Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit, held that such production was free from federal regulation, but
the Supreme Court reversed per curiam citing Wickard.45
Judge Thomsen, who found the minimum wage provisions constitutional
but felt that the overtime requirements of the Act probably went beyond the
permissible limits, and Judge Northrup, who found both provisions of the
Act invalid as applied to the states, employed a test which has been used by
4° See note 34 supra.
41 317 U.S. III (1942).
42 Id. at 118.
43 Id. at 125. It is submitted that other statements in Wickard apply to the state
sovereignty claim of the states in the instant case.
The power of Congress over interstate commerce is plenary and complete in
itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations
other than are prescribed in the Constitution . ... It follows that no form of
state activity can constitutionally thwart the regulatory power granted by the
commerce clause to Congress .... United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315
U.S. 110, 119.
Id. at 124.
44 United States v. Ohio, 354 F.2d 549 (6th Cir. 1965), rev'd per curiam, 385 U.S. 9
(1966).




the Court to determine the limits of the federal taxing power. This test is
whether the federal legislation interferes unduly with the state's performance
of its sovereign and indispensable functions of government. The rationale
underlying this test was that an unlimited taxing power in the federal govern-
ment posed a threat to the very existence of the states. Consequently, a con-
stitutional immunity of state instrumentalities was established in order that
the states would not be unduly burdened in the performance of their func-
tions."
It is obvious, in light of the 1966 Amendments to FLSA, that the com-
merce power is now also capable of burdening the states in the performance
of these essential functions. Prior to applying the test of "undue interference"
to the commerce power, however, one must determine whether that test, or
the immunity doctrine which it delimits, is any longer accorded constitutional
validity. The immunity doctrine reached its peak in Collector v. Day,"
wherein the constitutionality of a federal tax on the salary of a state judge
was questioned. In finding the tax invalid the Court pointed out that mainte-
nance of a judicial department is a sovereign function of all states and should
be left free and unimpaired. This principle has also been invoked by the Court
to invalidate a federal excise tax on the manufacture and sale of a motorcycle
to a municipal corporation for use in its police force." However, the holding
in Day was essentially overruled by Helvering v. Gerhardt," wherein
the salaries of employees of a state Port Authority were denied immunity. In
recognizing that the theory behind state immunity was the continued exis-
tence of the state as a political entity, the Court stated that to "attain that
end it is not ordinarily necessary to confer on the state a competitive advan-
tage over private persons in carrying on the operations of its government." 5°
The Court has further limited the immunity doctrine by sustaining the federal
taxation of: proceeds from state sponsored athletic contests for the benefit
of education; 51 profits from the sale of state bonds; 52 and profits from oil
produced by lessees of state lands. 53
Probably the most widely discussed example of immunity is that accorded
the interest on state and municipal bonds." Removal of this immunity would
46 See Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870); McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 159 (1819); 45 Yale L.J. 118 (1936).
47 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870).
48 Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570 (1931). "Justice Stone
and Brandeis dissented from this decision, and it is doubtful whether it would be
followed today." Legislative Ref. Serv., The Constitution of the United States of America,
S. Doc. No. 39, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 138 n.40 (1964).
45 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
55 Id. at 421.
51 Allen v. Regents, 304 U.S. 439 (1938).
52 Willcuts V. Bunn, 282 U.S. 216 (1931).
53 Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938). This case
specifically overruled Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932), 303 U.S.
at 387.
54 See Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U.S. 216 (1931); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
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affect to a substantial degree every function of the state governments. 55 The
conclusion has been expressed, however, that this immunity is a matter of
congressional grace rather than constitutional requirement." At any rate,
in light of the extensive erosion of the doctrine of immunity in the area of the
taxing power, it would appear questionable whether the test of undue inter-
ference, which defines the limits of that doctrine, should now for the first
time be applied to the commerce power.
Practical considerations also would appear to warrant rejection of the
undue interference test as the criterion for determining the validity of federal
regulation of the character found in this case. In the operation of this test,
the validity of the legislation in question is at least in part determined by the
degree of interference with essential and indispensable state functions. If a
state were paying its employees a wage far below that called for in the ELSA,
then the interference resulting from the extension of coverage under the Act
would be, in terms of financial burden, very great. On the other hand, if a
state were paying its employees a wage only slightly lower than that required
by the Act, then the interference resulting from the application of the Act's
wage and hour standards would be much smaller. Thus, to the extent that the
application of the test is affected by the degree of interference with essential
state functions, the test encourages the anomalous result of invalidating legis-
lation in those instances where the evil which prompted its passage is most
prevalent. In the case of the FLSA, this result would appear to directly con-
flict with the Act's stated purpose of eliminating the "conditions detrimental
to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health,
efficiency, and general well-being of workers ... ."57
Recognition must be given to the fact that the 1966 Amendments do
represent a manipulation of the internal affairs of the states by Congress.
However, it is submitted that the objections to them are more properly based
upon policy considerations than upon constitutionality. The Court has fos-
tered legislation such as that found in the FLSA by construing the commerce
power to be "as broad as the economic needs of the nation."58 This power
was expressly given to the federal government by the people, and the only
restraints governing its exercise are the rapport which they maintain with
the Congress, along with the influences they exert through the electoral pro-
cess.59
THOMAS J. SEXTON
55 For fiscal years ending during calendar year 1959, all states and local govern-
ments paid out interest totalling $1,740 million. An additional $827 million would have
had to have been paid were municipal bonds not tax exempt. Frank, Reciprocal Taxa-
tion of Governments, 40 Taxes 468, 484 (1962).
56 Department of Justice, Taxation of Government Bondholders and Employees—
The Immunity Rule and the 16th Amendment 32-62 (1938); 30 Ind. L.J. 341 (1955);
Rottschaefer, Federal Taxation of State and Municipal Bond Interest, 20 N.C.L. Rev.
141 (1942).
57 29 U.S.C. 202 (1964).
58 American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 103-04 (1946).
59 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 86-87 (1824).
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